

6/3/77 [1]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter w/att.	From Kathy Baker to The President (3pp.) re: Cong. Lee Hamilton's letter on Israel and the PLO/ enclosed in Hutcheson to Moore and Brzezinski 6/3/77 <i>opened 6/1/82</i>	6/1/77	A
memo w/att.	From Rick Hutcheson to The President (4 pp.) re Peter Bourne's letter on Cocaine Trafficking in Colombia / enclosed in Hutcheson to Bourne 6/3/77	6/2/77	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.- Pres.
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RESTRICTION CODES

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- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Friday - June 3, 1977

7:30 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

✓ 8:00 Meeting with the House Ways and Means Committee.
(Mr. Frank Moore) - The State Dining Room.

✓ 9:00 Budget Review Meeting. (Mr. Bert Lance).
(2 hrs.) The Cabinet Room.

11:00 Mr. Jody Powell - The Oval Office.

11:25 Mr. Don Ladd, Mr. Lee Roderick, and
(5 min.) Mr. Thomas Daniels, Church of Jesus Christ of
the Later-day Saints. (Ms. Fran Voorde)-Oval Office.

11:30 Vice President Walter F. Mondale,
Admiral Stansfield Turner, and
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

12:45 Congressman Donald V. Dellums. (Mr. Frank Moore).
(15 min.) The Oval Office.

1:00 Budget Review Meeting. (Mr. Bert Lance).
(2 hrs.) The Cabinet Room.

3:05 Mr. Jack Watson - The Oval Office.
(10 min.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

Frank Moore
Z. Brzezinski

The attached was returned in the
President's outbox and is forwarded
to you for your information and
appropriate action.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Letter from Lee Hamilton
on Israel/PLO

*Original to
Frank Moore*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1

Mr. President -

Attached is Lee Hamilton's letter
on Israel/PLO, per your request.

NSC and State have been working
on this and will have a draft
response prepared early next
week (A/S Atherton is out of town
and they want him to have some
input on the response).

K. Baker

K. Baker
Congressional Corresp.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, WIS., CHAIRMAN

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WILLIAM F. GOODLING, PA.
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, CALIF.

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

Congress of the United States Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

ack/draft by State
24 MAY 1977

May 23, 1977

C

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

During the last three weeks, you have on two occasions referred to an American commitment to Israel, made by the previous administration, whereby the United States would not deal with the Palestinian Liberation Organization until it fulfills conditions made part of the record of the Sinai II negotiations.

As published in the New York Times of September 18, 1975, these conditions are as follows:

"The United States will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as long as the PLO does not recognize the right of Israel to exist, and does not accept UN Security Council resolution 242 and 338."

During 1975 hearings before the Committee on International Relations, I asked former Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco concerning any commitment we might have made to Israel on this point. Secretary Sisco replied:

"...in my judgment we retain the freedom of action and the option to do what is necessary in the pursuance of our national interest...I have no hesitation in saying this to you. I think we have retained our options."

I suggested to Secretary Sisco that,

"you are locked into a position now so that you cannot negotiate with the PLO under any circumstances so long as this agreement is in effect."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

~~SECRET~~

PER 1/24/92 NLS HZ RE MR-NL-91-77
BY JS NARS, DATE 5/1/92

~~"SECRET"~~

Committee on International Relations

The President
Page Two
May 23, 1977

Sisco replied:


"I'm sorry, I cannot agree with that interpretation."

I would submit that this dialogue raises the possibility that we do not have as clear and firm a commitment as seemed to be implied in your statements. Naturally, there may be other compelling reasons for not pursuing any dialogue with the PLO, but I don't think it should be said that our policy rests on a commitment which we were told did not exist.

I appreciate your consideration of the enclosed.*

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,



Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman
Subcommittee on Europe
and the Middle East

LHH:dd

enclosure

(* Wasn't included.
Committee staff wrote
letter + don't know
what enclosure was.)

WELLHEAD TAX = REBATES
35-45-

GAS GUZZLER

OIL/GAS - 1/2 TRILLION BTU'S
80% → COAL 91%
STANDBY GAS

ENERGY #1 → WORSE
PARTNERS

REBATES IN LAW

DELAY ↑ ECONOMIC DRAG
PROPANE?

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Friday - June 3, 1977

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8:00	Meeting with the House Ways and Means Committee. (Mr. Frank Moore) - The State Dining Room.
9:00 (2 hrs.)	Budget Review Meeting. (Mr. Bert Lance). The Cabinet Room.
11:00	Mr. Jody Powell - The Oval Office.
11:25 (5 min.)	Mr. Don Ladd, Mr. Lee Roderick, and Mr. Thomas Daniels, Church of Jesus Christ of the Later-day Saints. (Ms. Fran Voorde) - Oval Office.
11:30	Vice President Walter F. Mondale, Admiral Stansfield Turner, and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.
12:45 (15 min.)	Congressman Donald V. Dellums. (Mr. Frank Moore). The Oval Office.
1:00 (2 hrs.)	Budget Review Meeting. (Mr. Bert Lance). The Cabinet Room.
3:05 (10 min.)	Mr. Jack Watson - The Oval Office.

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

Z. Brzezinski
Frank Moore
Tim Kraft

The attached was returned in the President's outbox and is forwarded to you for your information and appropriate action.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Meeting with Senator Humphrey

"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"

"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING;
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

confidential

ACTION	FYI		
		MONDALE	ENROLLED BILL
		COSTANZA	AGENCY REPORT
		EIZENSTAT	CAB DECISION
		JORDAN	EXECUTIVE ORDER
		LIPSHUTZ	Comments due to
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MOORE	Carp/Huron within
		POWELL	48 hours; due to
		WATSON	Staff Secretary
			next day

FOR STAFFING
FOR INFORMATION
FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

	ARAGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	KRAFT
	BOURNE		LANCE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BRZEZINSKI		LINDER
	BUTLER		MITCHELL
	CARP		POSTON
	H. CARTER		PRESS
	CLOUGH		B. RAINWATER
	FALLOWS		SCHLESINGER
	FIRST LADY		SCHNEIDERS
	GAMMILL		SCHULTZE
	HARDEN		SIEGEL
	HOYT		SMITH
	HUTCHESON		STRAUSS
	JAGODA		WELLS
	KING		VOORDE

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 2, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB*
SUBJECT: Meeting With Senator Humphrey

With reference to our conversation of yesterday regarding Senator Humphrey and Middle Eastern policy, please indicate whether I have your green light to proceed in setting up a meeting next week.

You may remember that the proposed scenario would be as follows: roughly a one-hour "cocktails" prior to dinner involving yourself, the Vice President, myself, and the Senator -- for the purpose of covering more fully the various aspects of the problem; this would be followed by a dinner here just between yourself and the Senator.

Do you wish me to go ahead in setting this up?

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE ✓

COMMENT _____

*Prefer
private lunch
J*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

Stu Eizenstat -

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Midge Costanza
Jody Powell
Jack Watson
Z. Brzezinski

Re: Concorde: U.S. Statement to
Appellate Court

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION	
FYI	
	MONDALE
X	COSTANZA
X	EIZENSTAT
	JORDAN
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
X	POWELL
X	WATSON

	ENROLLED BILL
	AGENCY REPORT
	CAB DECISION
	EXECUTIVE ORDER
	Comments due to Carp/Huron within 48 hours; due to Staff Secretary next day

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
X	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
X	BRZEZINSKI
	BUTLER
	CARP
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HOYT
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	KING

	KRAFT
	LANCE
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	POSTON
	PRESS
	B. RAINWATER
	SCHLESINGER
	SCHNEIDERS
	SCHULTZE
	SIEGEL
	SMITH
	STRAUSS
	WELLS
	VOORDE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

On question #1, Watson and Costanza favor Option A. Brzezinski favors Option B, stating that "to take a position against pre-emption would simply not be understood by the British and French, and would be damaging to our relations with them... I do not believe that abandoning our earlier position on preemption would undermine the President's credibility with Britain and France. We would not, after all, be arguing for pre-emption. And they would be far more concerned to get a trail for Concorde than to quibble on a point like this."

On question #2, Costanza believes the Federal government has no authority to pre-empt and that action such as Option A proposes would undermine the President's statements on the matter during the campaign and since taking office.

---Rick

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

STU EIZENSTAT

SUBJECT:

Concorde: U.S. Statement
to Appellate Court

*Stu - Preference:
Can we:
a) State that we
have no authority
to pre-empt -
b) Repeat support of
right to trial
period
Stu
?
This has
been my position
J*

The U.S. Court of Appeals has requested that the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the State Department file by June 6 a brief as to whether the New York Port Authority's ban on Concorde landings is pre-empted by DOT's approval of a Concorde demonstration at JFK Airport, or by existing international agreements.

Your guidance is requested on the manner in which we should frame the Administration's response.

BACKGROUND

District Court Judge Pollack nullified the Port Authority's ban on Concorde on the grounds that the Coleman decision had pre-empted local government action on the matter. Pollack said this authority to pre-empt arises generally from the Federal Aviation Act, but he limited his decision to the specific instance of the Federal Government's right to require experimental flights.

The result of Pollack's decision is consistent with our position in favor of a Concorde test at JFK Airport. However, his reasons contradict both the long-standing federal government view of DOT's power under the Federal Aviation Act and the position you have consistently stated in national and international forums:

"I have no authority at all over the New York port officials...I have no authority at all to tell...the New York Port Authority what to do about the Concorde."
(Interview with European Broadcasters, May 2)

AGENCY VIEWS

Last Friday I met with staff from DOT, State, Justice, NSC and Bob Lipshutz, to explore our position. DOT reiterated its previously taken position that under federal statutes it could not pre-empt the Port Authority. State felt that the

Federal government was given no pre-emptive authority under international agreements (a position State has stated publicly), but it nonetheless wished to avoid taking a firm position while negotiations over the Bermuda Agreement are continuing. Justice felt that Judge Pollack was probably incorrect in indicating that the Federal Aviation Act authorized the DOT to pre-empt local law, though it could argue to the contrary if we desired.

At the interagency meeting, there was agreement on 2 points that our response to the court should make:

- (1) The Administration continues to believe that the Concorde should be permitted to have a test at JFK.
- (2) We cannot take a position at present on the question of pre-emption under international agreements due to the sensitivity of the Bermuda negotiations.

ISSUES

Disagreement exists on two remaining points:

1. Should we stick by our previously stated position that the federal government does not have and has not exercised authority under the Federal Aviation Act to pre-empt the Port Authority ban on Concorde?

Option A - The Federal Government has not pre-empted.
(Favored by DOT and DOJ, Watson and Costanza)

Supporters of this option argue that we should limit the scope of federal power over local airport operations. They fear that expanding federal authority runs the potential risk of increasing federal liability for aircraft noise damage suits. From the standpoint of domestic politics they wish to avoid the appearance of having forced the Concorde into JFK. Finally they argue that a reversal of our position on pre-emption could undermine your credibility with Callaghan and Giscard, since you assured them that the federal government was unable to impose a decision on the Port Authority.

Option B - Take No Position

(Favored by State, NSC, and Bob Lipshutz)

Rather than take a position on the pre-emption issue, Bob Lipshutz has suggested that we could simply define the legal arguments for and against pre-emption in this case, without reaching a conclusion.

Supporters of this option argue that a government statement that we have no power to pre-empt will create serious foreign policy problems. I have been personally informed by the French Ambassador, speaking for both the British and the French, that we can expect severe press and government criticism if we restate our "no pre-emption" position to the Court. If the pro-Concorde district court decision is reversed, we will be blamed by these governments for the appeals court verdict. Moreover, the already difficult bilateral air negotiations with Britain will be further complicated. (However, our Ambassador to those talks, Alan Boyd, believes that the British talks should not be a decisive factor in our deliberations.)

One problem with this approach is that the Court may not feel that the government has complied fully with its request for our position on pre-emption. It will also make DOT appear to be uncertain about the intent of the Coleman decision, and indifferent to the resolution of the question.

RECOMMENDATION

I believe that Option A is the best choice. The British and French should be mollified by our restatement of support for experimental Concorde landings and by our listing of other reasons for the Appeals Court to uphold the lower court decision. We do not need to run the risks of federal pre-emption at this time, with so little consideration of the potential consequences.

2. Even if there is no pre-emption (on either international or domestic legal grounds) should we argue to the court that it should still affirm the lower court decision on other grounds? A case can be made that the Port Authority acted in a discriminatory manner in ignoring test results from Dulles, in refusing to permit the Concorde to compare its noise levels with those of other planes, and in unduly delaying a decision on landing rights.

Option A - Argue that the court should affirm.
(Supported by NSC, State, and DOJ)

This option will be most satisfactory to the British and French, and least acceptable to the anti-Concorde public in New York.

Option B - Cite arguments that could lead to an affirmation by the appeals court but refrain from urging the Court to do so. (Supported by DOT)

Secretary Adams feels strongly that we should not put ourselves in the position of forcing the Concorde into New York.

RECOMMENDATION

I believe that Option A is preferable. If we believe the experimental flights should take place, and we intend to cite reasons why we feel the Port Authorities actions are discriminatory, then it seems inconsistent for us not to urge the court to uphold the verdict.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Date: June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Midge Costanza *Part I - Opt A (consistent w/ Campaign Statement count to Callaghan - D'Estimoz)*
Hamilton Jordan
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson *Support Opt A*

FOR INFORMATION:

Jody Powell
The Vice President
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Part II - not Opt A

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Stu Eizenstat memo 6/1 re Concorde: U.S. Statement to Appellate Court.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: THURSDAY

DATE: JUNE 2, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION	FYI
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MONDALE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	COSTANZA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	EIZENSTAT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JORDAN
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	LIPSHUTZ
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MOORE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POWELL
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WATSON

<input type="checkbox"/>	ENROLLED BILL
<input type="checkbox"/>	AGENCY REPORT
<input type="checkbox"/>	CAB DECISION
<input type="checkbox"/>	EXECUTIVE ORDER
	Comments due to Carp/Huron within 48 hours; due to Staff Secretary next day

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FOR STAFFING
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
<input type="checkbox"/>	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND - due Noon Thursday

<input type="checkbox"/>	ARAGON
<input type="checkbox"/>	BOURNE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BRZEZINSKI
<input type="checkbox"/>	BUTLER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CARP
<input type="checkbox"/>	H. CARTER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CLOUGH
<input type="checkbox"/>	FALLOWS
<input type="checkbox"/>	FIRST LADY
<input type="checkbox"/>	GAMMILL
<input type="checkbox"/>	HARDEN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOYT
<input type="checkbox"/>	HUTCHESON
<input type="checkbox"/>	JAGODA
<input type="checkbox"/>	KING

<input type="checkbox"/>	KRAFT
<input type="checkbox"/>	LANCE
<input type="checkbox"/>	LINDER
<input type="checkbox"/>	MITCHELL
<input type="checkbox"/>	POSTON
<input type="checkbox"/>	PRESS
<input type="checkbox"/>	B. RAINWATER
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHLESINGER
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHNEIDERS
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHULTZE
<input type="checkbox"/>	SIEGEL
<input type="checkbox"/>	SMITH
<input type="checkbox"/>	STRAUSS
<input type="checkbox"/>	WELLS
<input type="checkbox"/>	VOORDE

Date: June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Midge Costanza ✓
Hamilton Jordan
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson - opt A strongly

FOR INFORMATION: Jody Powell
The Vice President
Zbigniew Brzezinski

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Stu Eizenstat memo 6/1 re Concorde: U.S. Statement
to Appellate Court.

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TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: THURSDAY

DATE: JUNE 2, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

On the first question of federal authority to pre-empt the New York Port Authority's ban, we are inclined to support option A, deferring to the legal opinions of Justice, State and Transportation. We feel that this position is consistent with campaign commitments made in New York State (Hofstra University speech) and with comments made to Callaghan and Giscard D'Estaing.

On the second question regarding arguments to the Court that it should reaffirm the lower court decision, we maintain our position that the federal government has no authority to pre-empt and that action such as option A proposes would undermine the President's statements on the matter both during the campaign and since taking office.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*

SUBJECT:

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to Appellate Court

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The result of Pollack's decision is consistent with our position in favor of a Concorde test at JFK Airport. However, his reasons contradict both the long-standing federal government view of DOT's power under the Federal Aviation Act and the position you have consistently stated in national and international forums:

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(Interview with European Broadcasters, May 2)

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At the interagency meeting, there was agreement on 2 points that our response to the court should make:

- (1) The Administration continues to believe that the Concorde should be permitted to have a test at JFK.
- (2) We cannot take a position at present on the question of pre-emption under international agreements due to the sensitivity of the Bermuda negotiations.

ISSUES

Disagreement exists on two remaining points:

1. Should we stick by our previously stated position that the federal government does not have and has not exercised authority under the Federal Aviation Act to pre-empt the Port Authority ban on Concorde?

Option A - The Federal Government has not pre-empted.
(Favored by DOT and DOJ)

Supporters of this option argue that we should limit the scope of federal power over local airport operations. They fear that expanding federal authority runs the potential risk of increasing federal liability for aircraft noise damage suits. From the standpoint of domestic politics they wish to avoid the appearance of having forced the Concorde into JFK. Finally they argue that a reversal of our position on pre-emption could undermine your credibility with Callaghan and Giscard, since you assured them that the federal government was unable to impose a decision on the Port Authority.

Option B - Take No Position

(Favored by State, NSC, and Bob Lipshutz)

Rather than take a position on the pre-emption issue, Bob Lipschutz has suggested that we could simply define the legal arguments for and against pre-emption in this case, without reaching a conclusion.

Supporters of this option argue that a government statement that we have no power to pre-empt will create serious foreign policy problems. I have been personally informed by the French Ambassador, speaking for both the British and the French, that we can expect severe press and government criticism if we restate our "no pre-emption" position to the Court. If the pro-Concorde district court decision is reversed, we will be blamed by these governments for the appeals court verdict. Moreover, the already difficult bilateral air negotiations with Britain will be further complicated. (However, our Ambassador to those talks, Alan Boyd, believes that the British talks should not be a decisive factor in our deliberations.)

One problem with this approach is that the Court may not feel that the government has complied fully with its request for our position on pre-emption. It will also make DOT appear to be uncertain about the intent of the Coleman decision, and indifferent to the resolution of the question.

While Dr. Brzezinski supports this option, he would prefer an even stronger statement that we can and will pre-empt the local Port Authority to require that the Concorde be allowed to land.

RECOMMENDATION

I believe that Option A is the best choice. The British and French should be mollified by our restatement of support for experimental Concorde landings and by our listing of other reasons for the Appeals Court to uphold the lower court decision. We do not need to run the risks of federal pre-emption at this time, with so little consideration of the potential consequences.

2. Even if there is no pre-emption (on either international or domestic legal grounds) should we argue to the court that it should still affirm the lower court decision on other grounds? A case can be made that the Port Authority acted in a discriminatory manner in ignoring test results from Dulles, in refusing to permit the Concorde to compare its noise levels with those of other planes, and in unduly delaying a decision on landing rights.

Option A - Argue that the court should affirm.
(Supported by NSC, State, and DOJ)

This option will be most satisfactory to the British and French, and least acceptable to the anti-Concorde public in New York.

Option B - Cite arguments that could lead to an affirmation by the appeals court but refrain from urging the Court to do so. (Supported by DOT)

Secretary Adams feels strongly that we should not put ourselves in the position of forcing the Concorde into New York.


RECOMMENDATION

I believe that Option A is preferable. If we believe the experimental flights should take place, and we intend to cite reasons why we feel the Port Authorities actions are discriminatory, then it seems inconsistent for us not to urge the court to uphold the verdict.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3402

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICK HUTCHESON
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 
SUBJECT: Concorde

With regard to Stu Eizenstat's memo of June 1, I have one substantive disagreement. On issue number 1 (pre-emption), I believe the best course would be Option B ("Take No Position"), as proposed by Bob Lipshutz. To take a position against pre-emption would simply not be understood by the British and French and would be damaging to our relations with them. If (as some counsel believe) this were a decisive argument in the overturning of the lower court decision, the foreign policy impact would be even greater.

On Option A, I do not believe that abandoning our earlier position on pre-emption would undermine the President's credibility with Britain and France. We would not, after all, be arguing for pre-emption. And they would be far more concerned to get a trial for Concorde than to quibble on a point like this.

The sentence on page 3, characterizing my views, should be deleted from the memorandum as inaccurate.

Date: June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Midge Costanza
Hamilton Jordan
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson ✓

FOR INFORMATION: Jody Powell
The Vice President
Zbigniew Brzezinski

1977 MAY 1 PM 2 38

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Stu Eizenstat memo 6/1 re Concorde: U.S. Statement
to Appellate Court.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: THURSDAY

DATE: JUNE 2, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments
Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

We Strongly Support Option A.
Watson / Frank

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

35
Date: June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Midge Costanza
Hamilton Jordan ✓
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson

FOR INFORMATION: Jody Powell
The Vice President
Zbigniew Brzezinski

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Stu Eizenstat memo 6/1 re Concorde: U.S. Statement
to Appellate Court.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: THURSDAY

DATE: JUNE 2, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☒ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

Date: June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Midge Costanza
Hamilton Jordan
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson

FOR INFORMATION: Jody Powell ✓
The Vice President
Zbigniew Brzezinski

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Stu Eizenstat memo 6/1 re Concorde: U.S. Statement
to Appellate Court.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: THURSDAY

DATE: JUNE 2, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

*I agree with the conclusions of this
memo. A well-written, concise presentation. I
will note as soon as decision is
made.* JEP

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required
material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: June 4, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat - *attached*
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson - *a decision is necessary - recommends President*

FOR INFORMATION:

Frank Moore
Hamilton Jordan

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT:

CONCORDE

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: Monday

DATE: JUNE 6, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

Stu Eizenstat
NOT
Sent to President
h/c Moore
Indefinite
not filed
by 6/6 245
ES

Date: June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Midge Costanza
Hamilton Jordan
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson

FOR INFORMATION: Jody Powell ✓
The Vice President
Zbigniew Brzezinski

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Stu Eizenstat memo 6/1 re Concorde: U.S. Statement
to Appellate Court.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: THURSDAY

DATE: JUNE 2, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

*I agree with conclusions of this
memo. A well-written, concise presentation. I
will note as soon as decision is
made.*

JEP

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION	FYI
	MONDALE
	COSTANZA
X	EIZENSTAT
X	JORDAN
X	LIPSHUTZ
X	MOORE
	POWELL
X	WATSON

	ENROLLED BILL
	AGENCY REPORT
	CAB DECISION
	EXECUTIVE ORDER
	Comments due to Carp/Huron within 48 hours; due to Staff Secretary next day

X	FOR STAFFING
X	FOR INFORMATION
	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BRZEZINSKI
	BUTLER
	CARP
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HOYT
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	KING

	KRAFT
	LANCE
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	POSTON
	PRESS
	B. RAINWATER
	SCHLESINGER
	SCHNEIDERS
	SCHULTZE
	SIEGEL
	SMITH
	STRAUSS
	WELLS
	VOORDE

Date: June 4, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson

FOR INFORMATION:

Frank Moore
Hamilton Jordan

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT:

CONCORDE

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: Monday

DATE: JUNE 6, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.☐ No comment.*Please note other comments below:***PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.**

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

STU EIZENSTAT

Seh

SUBJECT:

Brzezinski Memo

Re: Concorde

Dr. Brzezinski's memo deals with two issues which you and I discussed previously concerning the legal brief which the court required us to submit. The brief was submitted to the Court today.

As you suggested, the brief argues that there is no Federal pre-emption of Port Authority decision-making. On the should/could matter which Brzezinski raises the brief resolves this issue by setting forth alternative grounds for the Court to uphold the result of the lower court and states that if the Appeals Court should agree with any of these arguments this would lead to allowing a Concorde demonstration in New York.

Date: June 4, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat
Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson

FOR INFORMATION:

Frank Moore
Hamilton Jordan

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT:

CONCORDE

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: NOON

DAY: Monday

DATE: JUNE 6, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.☐ No comment.*Please note other comments below:*

Unfortunately, there is no real middle ground here. Either the President reverses his prior position on pre-emption or he sticks to it. Listing the pros and cons of the pre-emption issue without taking a position merely attracts criticism from both sides and doesn't help the situation. We recommend that the President not reverse his prior position.

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

2B.

SUBJECT: Concorde

In your response to Stu Eizenstat's memorandum (Tab A), you state your preference by asking whether it is possible to 1) state that we have no authority to pre-empt, but 2) repeat support of Concorde's right to a trial period.

That can be done -- but it would not solve our problem. By taking a firm position on no pre-emption, it is almost certain that the appeals court will overturn the lower court decision. Like it or not, we will be blamed for this decision by the British and French, as they have made clear. Even adding some "public relations" points to the brief on your desire for the trial will not obscure the central point. Nor will subsidiary legal points that indicate the right direction but still leave "no pre-emption" as our central point.

It would also be consistent with your position that you have no authority to tell the Governor and Port Authority what to do, to merely list the arguments on both sides of the pre-emption issue (as Bob Lipshutz suggested), without drawing a conclusion.

I believe this represents an effective compromise, best balancing the need for consistency against the foreign policy problems of categorically opposing pre-emption, and thereby destroying the British and French case.

At the very least, the brief should come out clearly and distinctly for an affirmation of the lower court ruling: saying that the appeals court should so decide, not just that it could do so. Otherwise, the British and French will have valid grounds for questioning our good faith.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 1, 1977

*Stu - Preference:
Can we:*

*a) State that we
have no authority
to pre-empt -
b) Repeat support of
right to trial
period*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*

SUBJECT:

Concorde: U.S. Statement
to Appellate Court

*This has
been my position*

The U.S. Court of Appeals has requested that the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the State Department file by June 6 a brief as to whether the New York Port Authority's ban on Concorde landings is pre-empted by DOT's approval of a Concorde demonstration at JFK Airport, or by existing international agreements.

Your guidance is requested on the manner in which we should frame the Administration's response.

BACKGROUND

District Court Judge Pollack nullified the Port Authority's ban on Concorde on the grounds that the Coleman decision had pre-empted local government action on the matter. Pollack said this authority to pre-empt arises generally from the Federal Aviation Act, but he limited his decision to the specific instance of the Federal Government's right to require experimental flights.

The result of Pollack's decision is consistent with our position in favor of a Concorde test at JFK Airport. However, his reasons contradict both the long-standing federal government view of DOT's power under the Federal Aviation Act and the position you have consistently stated in national and international forums:

"I have no authority at all over the New York port officials...I have no authority at all to tell...the New York Port Authority what to do about the Concorde."
(Interview with European Broadcasters, May 2)

AGENCY VIEWS

Last Friday I met with staff from DOT, State, Justice, NSC and Bob Lipshutz, to explore our position. DOT reiterated its previously taken position that under federal statutes it could not pre-empt the Port Authority. State felt that the

Federal government was given no pre-emptive authority under international agreements (a position State has stated publicly), but it nonetheless wished to avoid taking a firm position while negotiations over the Bermuda Agreement are continuing. Justice felt that Judge Pollack was probably incorrect in indicating that the Federal Aviation Act authorized the DOT to pre-empt local law, though it could argue to the contrary if we desired.

At the interagency meeting, there was agreement on 2 points that our response to the court should make:

- (1) The Administration continues to believe that the Concorde should be permitted to have a test at JFK.
- (2) We cannot take a position at present on the question of pre-emption under international agreements due to the sensitivity of the Bermuda negotiations.

ISSUES

Disagreement exists on two remaining points:

1. Should we stick by our previously stated position that the federal government does not have and has not exercised authority under the Federal Aviation Act to pre-empt the Port Authority ban on Concorde?

Option A - The Federal Government has not pre-empted.
(Favored by DOT and DOJ, Watson and Costanza)

Supporters of this option argue that we should limit the scope of federal power over local airport operations. They fear that expanding federal authority runs the potential risk of increasing federal liability for aircraft noise damage suits. From the standpoint of domestic politics they wish to avoid the appearance of having forced the Concorde into JFK. Finally they argue that a reversal of our position on pre-emption could undermine your credibility with Callaghan and Giscard, since you assured them that the federal government was unable to impose a decision on the Port Authority.

Option B - Take No Position

(Favored by State, NSC, and Bob Lipshutz)

Rather than take a position on the pre-emption issue, Bob Lipshutz has suggested that we could simply define the legal arguments for and against pre-emption in this case, without reaching a conclusion.

Supporters of this option argue that a government statement that we have no power to pre-empt will create serious foreign policy problems. I have been personally informed by the French Ambassador, speaking for both the British and the French, that we can expect severe press and government criticism if we restate our "no pre-emption" position to the Court. If the pro-Concorde district court decision is reversed, we will be blamed by these governments for the appeals court verdict. Moreover, the already difficult bilateral air negotiations with Britain will be further complicated. (However, our Ambassador to those talks, Alan Boyd, believes that the British talks should not be a decisive factor in our deliberations.)

One problem with this approach is that the Court may not feel that the government has complied fully with its request for our position on pre-emption. It will also make DOT appear to be uncertain about the intent of the Coleman decision, and indifferent to the resolution of the question.

RECOMMENDATION

I believe that Option A is the best choice. The British and French should be mollified by our restatement of support for experimental Concorde landings and by our listing of other reasons for the Appeals Court to uphold the lower court decision. We do not need to run the risks of federal pre-emption at this time, with so little consideration of the potential consequences.

2. Even if there is no pre-emption (on either international or domestic legal grounds) should we argue to the court that it should still affirm the lower court decision on other grounds? A case can be made that the Port Authority acted in a discriminatory manner in ignoring test results from Dulles, in refusing to permit the Concorde to compare its noise levels with those of other planes, and in unduly delaying a decision on landing rights.

Option A - Argue that the court should affirm.
(Supported by NSC, State, and DOJ)

This option will be most satisfactory to the British and French, and least acceptable to the anti-Concorde public in New York.

Option B - Cite arguments that could lead to an affirmation by the appeals court but refrain from urging the Court to do so. (Supported by DOT)

Secretary Adams feels strongly that we should not put ourselves in the position of forcing the Concorde into New York.

RECOMMENDATION

I believe that Option A is preferable. If we believe the experimental flights should take place, and we intend to cite reasons why we feel the Port Authorities actions are discriminatory, then it seems inconsistent for us not to urge the court to uphold the verdict.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5

INFORMATION

3 June 1977

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN
RICK HUTCHESON
SUBJECT: Summary of DNC Daily Political Reports
for the Week of May 30

CAMPAIGN '78

1. According to his own poll, Massachusetts A.G. Frank Bellotti is one point ahead of Sen. Brooke. Kevin White is also testing the waters.
2. N.C. Senate hopefuls Rufus Edmisten and Luther Hodges met in an attempt to reduce party tensions resulting from their competition for Jesse Helms' seat.
3. A recent R.I. statewide poll shows Sen. Pell a strong candidate for reelection against Mayor Cianci of Providence, who is seeking the GOP nomination.
4. Former N.M. Governor Bruce King will run again for Governor. Incumbent Jerry Apodaca is weighing a Senate race.
5. The Florida gubernatorial race heats up with rumors that Askew will resign to permit Lt. Gov. Jim Williams run as an incumbent. Meanwhile, presumed front-runner Bob Shevin continues to lock up party support. Other candidates are Bill Gunther and Bruce Smathers.
6. Bill Stansbury won the Democratic nomination for Mayor of Louisville, defeating the candidate backed by outgoing Mayor Harvey Sloane.
7. An N.T.A. phone poll in New Jersey shows Byrne with about 25%, favored for winning renomination next Tuesday. An incredible 50% of respondents remain undecided. Congressman Robert Roe (spending \$800,000) and Ralph DeRose are fighting for second place.

UNIVERSAL VOTER REGISTRATION

8. A UVR proposal was killed in the Iowa State Senate, and will be reconsidered early in 1978.

PAGE TWO

9. Florida Secretary of State Smathers sent a letter opposing UVR to the Florida congressional delegation; he cites Federal encroachment on state and local elections.
10. UVR passed in Ohio, after the state legislature overrode a veto by Gov. Rhodes.

MISCELLANEOUS

11. Pennsylvania House Speaker Herb Fineman resigned after a bribery conviction, and was replaced by Leroy Irvis.
12. Texas State Chair Calvin Guest was quoted in a recent HOUSTON POST article saying that he and Gov. Briscoe are upset that of 18 Texans appointed, only two (Strauss and White) were favored by Guest and Briscoe.
13. The Maine Democratic Party has been holding county Energy Seminars. The first participants have been supportive of the President's proposed policy.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION	FYI		
		MONDALE	ENROLLED BILL
		COSTANZA	AGENCY REPORT
		EIZENSTAT	CAB DECISION
		JORDAN	EXECUTIVE ORDER
		LIPSHUTZ	Comments due to
		MOORE	Carp/Huron within
		POWELL	48 hours; due to
		WATSON	Staff Secretary
			next day

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
✓	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

	ARAGON		KRAFT
	BOURNE		LANCE
	BRZEZINSKI		LINDER
	BUTLER		MITCHELL
	CARP		POSTON
	H. CARTER		PRESS
	CLOUGH		B. RAINWATER
	FALLOWS		SCHLESINGER
	FIRST LADY		SCHNEIDERS
	GAMMILL		SCHULTZE
	HARDEN		SIEGEL
	HOYT		SMITH
✓	HUTCHESON		STRAUSS
	JAGODA		WELLS
	KING		VOORDE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

Hamilton Jordan

The attached was returned in the
President's outbox and is forwarded
to you for your information.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Article entitled "Life Under
Rickover"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
FYI

	MONDALE
	COSTANZA
	EIZENSTAT
X	JORDAN
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON

	ENROLLED BILL
	AGENCY REPORT
	CAB DECISION
	EXECUTIVE ORDER

Comments due to
Carp/Huron within
48 hours; due to
Staff Secretary
next day

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
X	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BRZEZINSKI
	BUTLER
	CARP
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HOYT
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	KING

	KRAFT
	LANCE
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	POSTON
	PRESS
	B. RAINWATER
	SCHLESINGER
	SCHNEIDERS
	SCHULTZE
	SIEGEL
	SMITH
	STRAUSS
	WELLS
	VOORDE

MR. PRESIDENT -
ARTICLE I
MENTIONED.

N.J.

Ham

Thanks -
J

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FRIDAY, MAY 27, 1977

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

D 1

Life Under Rickover: Stormy Duty in the Silent Service

By Edward L. Beach

Special to The Washington Post

Edward L. Beach commanded the nuclear submarine Triton on her submerged circumnavigation in 1960. He is noted for his novels "Run Silent, Run Deep" and "Dust on the Sea" and is at work on a third.

Jimmy Carter puts to sea in a nuclear submarine off the coast of Florida today with Adm. Hyman George Rickover, whom the President has often called one of the greatest influences on him during his formative years.

With all due respect, the President will have to move over on this one. He is not alone on this bench. If all the nuclear submariners in the Navy were asked the question, in my humble (but somewhat informed) opinion all, without exception, would give the same answer.


A bit of personal history: I, too, was a qualified nuclear submariner, a "graduate" of the Rickover academy. I consider myself an honest individual, not excessively changeable. Yet I must confess that the admiral is able to turn me into an intellectual yo-yo, praising him one moment, griping about him the next. He has had that effect on all of us. More than once I have felt, and occasionally loudly announced, "I don't have to take this deleted expletive from anybody!"—and gone right on taking it, and even, at the end, liking it.

I have heard a Chief of Naval Operations, in the full regalia of his own four stars, say, "You fellows may think I'm running the Navy, but you are wrong. I work for Rick, like everybody else."

At 77, Rickover has held the same job for 31 years and will probably rival his father, who worked in his own tailor shop until death at 93. Counting his time at Annapolis, he has served in the Navy continuously for 59 years, already a record exceeded only by one or two five-star military leaders of World War II.

More than once I have praised him

Se * RICKOVER D3, Col. *



Polaris submarine U.S.S. George Washington Carver, above: President Carter and Adm. Hyman George Rickover in the White House in February.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

Z. Brzezinski -

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: MINUTEMAN III Production
Options

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*include copy
of my note*

ACTION
FYI

<input type="checkbox"/>	MONDALE
<input type="checkbox"/>	COSTANZA
<input type="checkbox"/>	EIZENSTAT
<input type="checkbox"/>	JORDAN
<input type="checkbox"/>	LIPSHUTZ
<input type="checkbox"/>	MOORE
<input type="checkbox"/>	POWELL
<input type="checkbox"/>	WATSON

<input type="checkbox"/>	ENROLLED BILL
<input type="checkbox"/>	AGENCY REPORT
<input type="checkbox"/>	CAB DECISION
<input type="checkbox"/>	EXECUTIVE ORDER
	Comments due to Carp/Huron within 48 hours; due to Staff Secretary next day

<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR STAFFING
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR INFORMATION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
<input type="checkbox"/>	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
<input type="checkbox"/>	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

<input type="checkbox"/>	ARAGON
<input type="checkbox"/>	BOURNE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BRZEZINSKI
<input type="checkbox"/>	BUTLER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CARP
<input type="checkbox"/>	H. CARTER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CLOUGH
<input type="checkbox"/>	FALLOWS
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<input type="checkbox"/>	HARDEN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOYT
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<input type="checkbox"/>	B. RAINWATER
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHLESINGER
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHNEIDERS
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHULTZE
<input type="checkbox"/>	SIEGEL
<input type="checkbox"/>	SMITH
<input type="checkbox"/>	STRAUSS
<input type="checkbox"/>	WELLS
<input type="checkbox"/>	VOORDE

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

May 25, 1977

3619
Comment
J

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MINUTEMAN III Production Options

This is in response to your memorandum of 13 May 1977 regarding MINUTEMAN III.

At present, we are proceeding on a plan to procure ten MINUTEMAN III missiles with FY 1977 funds while keeping open the options to produce more missiles or components as appropriate. Our present plan goes through the end of June 1977. By that time the following options represent the principal available alternatives:

- a. Produce 60 missiles and terminate all component production.
- b. Produce 60 missiles and terminate the production line except for the NS-20 guidance set.
- c. Produce ten missiles and terminate all remaining production.
- d. Produce ten missiles and terminate the production line except for the NS-20 guidance set. Continue to produce 50 additional guidance sets for a total of 60. A savings of approximately \$40 million would result.
- e. Produce ten missiles and terminate the production line except for the NS-20 guidance set. Use remaining FY 1977 funds to purchase additional guidance sets (up to 85 for a maximum total of 95) with FY 1977 funds. These would be produced during FY 1977 and part of FY 1978. In addition, we would fund long lead items for continued production in FY 1978.

Option a: This option is based on the initial FY 1977 budget submitted to Congress and was intended to retain the majority of the critical MINUTEMAN III production vendors on line through August 1977 for SALT purposes. Missile production capability would diminish rapidly after FY 1977.

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Option b is the same as Option a except that it continues the most critical element of the production line for further MINUTEMAN III production or for the modernization of MINUTEMAN II. Additional FY 1977 and FY 1978 funds of \$4.5 million and \$90 million respectively would be required to maintain production through FY 1978.

Option c produces a cost savings of \$110 million if the decision is made by 1 July 1977. Missile production capability would diminish rapidly at that time.

Option d conforms closely to our FY 1978 budget decisions made earlier this year. A savings of approximately \$40 million would result if the decision were made by 1 July 1977. Missile production capability would diminish rapidly at that time except for some short prolongation of guidance set production.

Option e retains the critical NS-20 guidance set production capability beyond the FY 77 buy. A production rate would be selected to stretch out the period of buy, if feasible, while retaining the capability to produce a reliable guidance set for as long as possible. The present production rate is five guidance sets per month. This represents the maximum rate of production, and would require funding not to exceed \$32.6 million in FY 1978. If we can retain the production capability at a lower rate, the FY 1978 funding would be less.

I recommend that we proceed with Option e. This would retain most of the critical MINUTEMAN III vendor production capability until July 1977. It provides for a continued capability to produce the most critical element, the guidance set, with the least budget turbulence. It avoids starting costs estimated at greater than \$100 million should MINUTEMAN III production be reinitiated or should the guidance set for M-X or any other follow-on missile develop technical or production difficulties and require a substitute. The NS-20 is also one of the key elements for potential MINUTEMAN II modernization. This potential use is protected by Option e.

Harold Brown

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

Bert Lance recommends that
you hold to your earlier
decision to terminate
missile and component
production in 1977.

Brzezinski had no comment.

Rick

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*exp 4 2P
Wed from JB*

Date: May 27, 1977 *NC*

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Bert Lance

attached / not cover

FOR INFORMATION:

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Secretary Brown memo 5/25 re Minuteman III
Production Options.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 2:00 P.M.

DAY: Tuesday

DATE: May 31, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments
Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur. ☐ No comment.
Please note other comments below:

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MINUTEMAN III Production Options

This is in response to your memorandum of 13 May 1977 regarding MINUTEMAN III.

At present, we are proceeding on a plan to procure ten MINUTEMAN III missiles with FY 1977 funds while keeping open the options to produce more missiles or components as appropriate. Our present plan goes through the end of June 1977. By that time the following options represent the principal available alternatives:

- a. Produce 60 missiles and terminate all component production.
- b. Produce 60 missiles and terminate the production line except for the NS-20 guidance set.
- c. Produce ten missiles and terminate all remaining production.
- d. Produce ten missiles and terminate the production line except for the NS-20 guidance set. Continue to produce 50 additional guidance sets for a total of 60. A savings of approximately \$40 million would result.
- e. Produce ten missiles and terminate the production line except for the NS-20 guidance set. Use remaining FY 1977 funds to purchase additional guidance sets (up to 85 for a maximum total of 95) with FY 1977 funds. These would be produced during FY 1977 and part of FY 1978. In addition, we would fund long lead items for continued production in FY 1978.

Option a: This option is based on the initial FY 1977 budget submitted to Congress and was intended to retain the majority of the critical MINUTEMAN III production vendors on line through August 1977 for SALT purposes. Missile production capability would diminish rapidly after FY 1977.

Option b is the same as Option a except that it continues the most critical element of the production line for further MINUTEMAN III production or for the modernization of MINUTEMAN II. Additional FY 1977 and FY 1978 funds of \$4.5 million and \$90 million respectively would be required to maintain production through FY 1978.

Option c produces a cost savings of \$110 million if the decision is made by 1 July 1977. Missile production capability would diminish rapidly at that time.

Option d conforms closely to our FY 1978 budget decisions made earlier this year. A savings of approximately \$40 million would result if the decision were made by 1 July 1977. Missile production capability would diminish rapidly at that time except for some short prolongation of guidance set production.

Option e retains the critical NS-20 guidance set production capability beyond the FY 77 buy. A production rate would be selected to stretch out the period of buy, if feasible, while retaining the capability to produce a reliable guidance set for as long as possible. The present production rate is five guidance sets per month. This represents the maximum rate of production, and would require funding not to exceed \$32.6 million in FY 1978. If we can retain the production capability at a lower rate, the FY 1978 funding would be less.

I recommend that we proceed with Option e. This would retain most of the critical MINUTEMAN III vendor production capability until July 1977. It provides for a continued capability to produce the most critical element, the guidance set, with the least budget turbulence. It avoids starting costs estimated at greater than \$100 million should MINUTEMAN III production be reinitiated or should the guidance set for M-X or any other follow-on missile develop technical or production difficulties and require a substitute. The NS-20 is also one of the key elements for potential MINUTEMAN II modernization. This potential use is protected by Option e.

Harold Brown

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

Jody Powell --

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Tim Kraft

Re: Meeting with Reporters

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION	FYI		
		MONDALE	ENROLLED BILL
		COSTANZA	AGENCY REPORT
		EIZENSTAT	CAB DECISION
		JORDAN	EXECUTIVE ORDER
		LIPSHUTZ	Comments due to
		MOORE	Carp/Huron within
	X	POWELL	48 hours; due to
		WATSON	Staff Secretary
			next day

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
X	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

	ARAGON	X	KRAFT
	BOURNE		LANCE
	BRZEZINSKI		LINDER
	BUTLER		MITCHELL
	CARP		POSTON
	H. CARTER		PRESS
	CLOUGH		B. RAINWATER
	FALLOWS		SCHLESINGER
	FIRST LADY		SCHNEIDERS
	GAMMILL		SCHULTZE
	HARDEN		SIEGEL
	HOYT		SMITH
	HUTCHESON		STRAUSS
	JAGODA		WELLS
	KING		VOORDE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

June 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : The President
FROM: Jody Powell *JH*

To fulfill your wish to meet informally with reporters covering the White House, I suggest we invite them in groups of 10 or so to talk with you around the White House swimming pool. These meetings could be arranged on the day they are to occur, and they could be held in late afternoon. They would be quasi-social, with the conversation totally off the record (although we could expect almost anything you said to come out sooner or later).

The pool would provide a relaxed setting away from "official" surroundings, yet convenient to you. You could leave after a half hour and any reporters who wished could remain to swim for a short time. If we did not wish to tie up the pool past 30 minutes or so, we could not invite them to swim but just use the pool as a setting.

We could accommodate the requisite 50 or 60 reporters during the three-month summer swimming season. The onset of fall would automatically end the arrangement and keep it from becoming a regular event.

I believe this arrangement has several advantages over luncheons or breakfast sessions. It is less formal, less expensive and less time-consuming for you. It also lends itself to bringing in key staff or other administration officials to continue the discussions after you have left.

____ Approve
____ Disapprove
____ ☒ Let's talk

*Minimize number
of sessions. I doubt
your 30 minute time.*
J

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

Midge Costanza:

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Jim King

Re: Greater Involvement of
"Distinguished Americans" in
Government

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

Jim King disagrees with Midge. He points to:

- the political problems in choosing the "domestic ambassadors"
- he says Midge has greatly underestimated the staff time which would be involved -- the Administration already has more than 100,000 resumes on file (Hugh Carter makes the same point)
- Midge's memo doesn't indicate what will be done with the opinions received -- there should be more to the program than "input"

Hugh Carter thinks the program is a good idea, and favors a pilot study, although more planning is needed on the idea.

Richard Harden concurs with Midge.

---Rick

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION	FYI		
		MONDALE	ENROLLED BILL
	✓	COSTANZA	AGENCY REPORT
		EIZENSTAT	CAB DECISION
		JORDAN	EXECUTIVE ORDER
		LIPSHUTZ	Comments due to
		MOORE	Carp/Huron within
		POWELL	48 hours; due to
		WATSON	Staff Secretary
			next day

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
✓	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

	ARAGON		KRAFT
	BOURNE		LANCE
	BRZEZINSKI		LINDER
	BUTLER		MITCHELL
	CARP		POSTON
	H. CARTER		PRESS
	CLOUGH		B. RAINWATER
	FALLOWS		SCHLESINGER
	FIRST LADY		SCHNEIDERS
	GAMMILL		SCHULTZE
	HARDEN		SIEGEL
	HOYT		SMITH
	HUTCHESON		STRAUSS
	JAGODA		WELLS
✓	KING		VOORDE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

25 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MARGARET COSTANZA *MC*

SUBJECT: Greater involvement of "Distinguished Americans" in Government

Statement of Problem

There are a number of people in this country who have excelled in their particular field of work but who are not involved in the governmental process because of a lack of time to get involved in "politics." While these people do not wish to become government employees, they do wish to have an avenue to help make our country a better place to live. There is a need to establish a mechanism to facilitate this involvement.

This problem was brought to our attention by Mr. Reginald Fleet of Fleet Company, La Jolla, California, a close friend of Phillip Alston. I would like to suggest that we initiate the following pilot project to develop techniques for dealing with this group of people.

I. Objectives of Pilot Project (California):

Determine if it is feasible to utilize the Office of Public Liaison in The White House to:

1. Identify distinguished citizens.
2. Route these individuals to the area of government where they can be of most assistance.
3. Call upon these individuals to:
 - a. Comment on Administration proposals;
 - b. Support Administration proposals and initiatives locally.

II. Operation of Pilot Project (California):

1. A list from Mr. Fleet will be received. Additional names will be gathered to create a well rounded cadre of distinguished citizens. Jim King's office could help provide

-2-

names in various areas, i.e., women, blacks, Hispanics. Effort will be made to select from diverse areas, i.e., business, arts, veterans, human rights. Resumes will be obtained (~~see Tab A~~).

2. Richard Reiman and other members of my staff will analyze the resumes and determine the most appropriate agency with which the individual may relate. Upon selection, a letter from me will go out (~~Tab B~~) to the individual.

3. A name file of the individuals will be developed and periodically letters concerning key Administration proposals will be mailed to these individuals (~~Tab C~~).

4. I am not requesting that the letters go out under your signature as I believe that would tend to attract people who might simply wish a letter from The President. Furthermore, I believe my signature will allow a greater informality and flexibility.

III. Evaluation of Pilot Project (California):

1. Contact agency personnel.
2. Contact selected individuals on list.
3. Determine additional workload on The White House Office of Public Liaison.
4. Make subjective judgments as to the effectiveness of the project.
5. Prepare report summarizing above findings (six months after implementation).

IV. Estimated Cost of Pilot Project:

1. Seven hours per week staff time (Richard Reiman).
2. Three hours per week secretarial time.
3. Incidental mailing costs.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ ✓

H/16
JC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Stu will
comment -
re*

Date: May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat Jim King - *strongly against - see attached*
Hamilton Jordan Greg Schneiders
Jody Powell Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson *nc*
Hugh Carter *attached - concurs, but has reservations*
Richard Harden *concur*

FOR INFORMATION: The Vice President

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater involvement
of "Distinguished Americans" in Government.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 5:00 P.M.

DAY: FRIDAY

DATE: MAY 27, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

*Bill - get
additional
comments*

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Distinguished
Ambassadors in
Government*

ACTION
FYI

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MONDALE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	COSTANZA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	EIZENSTAT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JORDAN
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	LIPSHUTZ
<input type="checkbox"/>	MOORE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POWELL
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WATSON

<input type="checkbox"/>	ENROLLED BILL
<input type="checkbox"/>	AGENCY REPORT
<input type="checkbox"/>	CAB DECISION
<input type="checkbox"/>	EXECUTIVE ORDER

Comments due to
Carp/Huron within
48 hours; due to
Staff Secretary
next day

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FOR STAFFING
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
<input type="checkbox"/>	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
<input type="checkbox"/>	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

<input type="checkbox"/>	ARAGON
<input type="checkbox"/>	BOURNE
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRZEZINSKI
<input type="checkbox"/>	BUTLER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CARP
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	H. CARTER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CLOUGH
<input type="checkbox"/>	FALLOWS
<input type="checkbox"/>	FIRST LADY
<input type="checkbox"/>	GAMMILL
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HARDEN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOYT
<input type="checkbox"/>	HUTCHESON
<input type="checkbox"/>	JAGODA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	KING

<input type="checkbox"/>	KRAFT
<input type="checkbox"/>	LANCE
<input type="checkbox"/>	LINDER
<input type="checkbox"/>	MITCHELL
<input type="checkbox"/>	POSTON
<input type="checkbox"/>	PRESS
<input type="checkbox"/>	B. RAINWATER
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHLESINGER
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SCHNEIDERS
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCHULTZE
<input type="checkbox"/>	SIEGEL
<input type="checkbox"/>	SMITH
<input type="checkbox"/>	STRAUSS
<input type="checkbox"/>	WELLS
<input type="checkbox"/>	VOORDE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

25 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

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SUBJECT: Greater involvement of "Distinguished Americans" in Government

Statement of Problem

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1. A list from Mr. Fleet will be received. Additional names will be gathered to create a well rounded cadre of distinguished citizens. Jim King's office could help provide

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3. Determine additional workload on The White House Office of Public Liaison.
4. Make subjective judgments as to the effectiveness of the project.
5. Prepare report summarizing above findings (six months after implementation).

IV. Estimated Cost of Pilot Project:

1. Seven hours per week staff time (Richard Reiman).
2. Three hours per week secretarial time.
3. Incidental mailing costs.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat Jim King ✓
 Hamilton Jordan Greg Schneiders
 Jody Powell Bob Lipshutz
 Jack Watson
 Hugh Carter
 Richard Harden

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

TO: 7BK
 FOR INFORMATION: The Vice President
 FROM: M. Cusack DATE:☒ Action☐ Return☐ Info☐ Destroy☐ Acknowledge☐ Forward to:

Other: _____

COPY SENT TO:

SUBJECT: Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater involvement
 of "Distinguished Americans" in Government
☐ Action ☐ Info
☐ Action ☐ Info
☐ Action ☐ Info

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
 TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 5:00 P.M.

DAY: FRIDAY

DATE: MAY 27, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other: _____

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

Attached

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required
 material please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone 7050)

Date: May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat Jim King
Hamilton Jordan Greg Schneiders
Jody Powell Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson
Hugh Carter
Richard Harden

FOR INFORMATION: The Vice President

1977 MAY 25 PM 4 56

BK
comment
jn

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater involvement
of "Distinguished Americans" in Government.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 5:00 P.M.

DAY: FRIDAY

DATE: MAY 27, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

Please note other comments below:

☒ No comment.

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TAB A

Dear _____

Your name has been submitted as an individual who has excelled in _____. We in The White House are interested in helping people like you participate more in the governmental decision making process. While we have no honors to bestow, we would like to encourage your participation.

To help us facilitate a conduit for your communication, I ask that you submit your resume to Richard Reiman of my staff, so that we may select appropriate areas for your advice.

Sincerely yours,

Margaret Costanza
Assistant to The President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TAB B

Dear _____

Thank you for your response to my letter. I have contacted (Administration Official and Title) and he is most interested in having your input and advice. Feel free to contact (Administration Official) directly.

It is also my hope that I, or Mr. Reiman, may periodically call upon you for your advice regarding key issues.

Thank you again for your response.

Sincerely,

Margaret Costanza
Assistant to The President

cc: (Administration Official)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TAB C

Dear _____

As you know, The President has recently expressed his opinion regarding (issue). For your information, a press release regarding (issue) is attached.

Your input would be most appreciated by The President. Please feel free to write to Mr. Reiman of my staff with your thoughts.

Sincerely,

Margaret Costanza
Assistant to The President


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 31, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JAMES B. KING 

SUBJECT:

Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater
Involvement of "Distinguished Americans"
in Government

The program as presented is fraught with political and structural dangers:

1. There is no mechanism to screen politically the persons chosen. In essence, a number of persons are being selected as "domestic ambassadors" in an informal and haphazard manner. Before rushing to embrace this project, we should heed the extraordinary political difficulties we have encountered selecting our ambassadors and other appointees.
2. The estimate of seven hours staff time seems unrealistically optimistic. The newspapers will inevitably learn of the program, and the publicity will elicit hundreds of offers from persons eager to serve. By way of comparison, the President's requests for persons to serve in the Administration has produced more than 100,000 resumes thus far.
3. Nowhere is it indicated what use, if any, will be made of the opinions received. Doesn't there need to be more to the program than "input"?

WASHINGTON

Date: May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat Jim King
 Hamilton Jordan Greg Schneiders
 Jody Powell Bob Lipshutz
 Jack Watson
 Hugh Carter ✓
 Richard Harden

FOR INFORMATION: The Vice President

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater involvement
 of "Distinguished Americans" in Government.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
 TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 5:00 P.M.

DAY: FRIDAY

DATE: MAY 27, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

The idea is a good one. However, the implementation appears to need more planning. After a person is selected and referred to an agency there needs to be continued followup to insure that the person is in fact involved. I wonder if seven hours staff and three hours secretarial time per week is enough to administer the test (pilot) — it certainly would take a great deal more manpower to administer the main program if adopted. A pilot study is OK w/me. D. Carter

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

Date: May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat Jim King
Hamilton Jordan Greg Schneiders
Jody Powell Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson
Hugh Carter
Richard Harden ✓

FOR INFORMATION: The Vice President

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater involvement
of "Distinguished Americans" in Government.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 5:00 P.M.

DAY: FRIDAY

DATE: MAY 27, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☒ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

Richard Harden

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

Date: May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat ✓ Jim King
Hamilton Jordan Greg Schneiders
Jody Powell Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson
Hugh Carter
Richard Harden

FOR INFORMATION: The Vice President

977 MAY 25 PM 5 24

316

Cap
Lazarus

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater involvement
of "Distinguished Americans" in Government.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 5:00 P.M.

DAY: FRIDAY

DATE: MAY 27, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

Please note other comments below:

✓ No comment. *Stu Eizenstat*

→ Stu - recommend no comment or
a comment indicating that
the attached form letters
should be rewritten to
seen less impersonal and to
eliminate a request for a
resume

DR

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required
material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

Date: May 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat Jim King
Hamilton Jordan Greg Schneiders
Jody Powell Bob Lipshutz
Jack Watson
Hugh Carter
Richard Harden

FOR INFORMATION: The Vice President

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Midge Costanza memo 5/25/77 re Greater involvement
of "Distinguished Americans" in Government.

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 5:00 P.M.

DAY: FRIDAY

DATE: MAY 27, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

Other: ☒ Your comments

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

Please note other comments below:

☐ No comment. !!!**PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.**

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 3, 1977

The Vice President
Stu Eizenstat
Hamilton Jordan
Frank Moore
Jody Powell
Jack Watson

Re: Common Receipts Estimates

The attached was returned in the President's
outbox and is forwarded to you for your infor-
mation.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION	FYI
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MONDALE
	COSTANZA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	EIZENSTAT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JORDAN
	LIPSHUTZ
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MOORE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POWELL
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WATSON

<input type="checkbox"/>	ENROLLED BILL
<input type="checkbox"/>	AGENCY REPORT
<input type="checkbox"/>	CAB DECISION
<input type="checkbox"/>	EXECUTIVE ORDER
	Comments due to Carp/Huron within 48 hours; due to Staff Secretary next day

<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR STAFFING
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
<input type="checkbox"/>	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
<input type="checkbox"/>	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

<input type="checkbox"/>	ARAGON
<input type="checkbox"/>	BOURNE
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRZEZINSKI
<input type="checkbox"/>	BUTLER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CARP
<input type="checkbox"/>	H. CARTER
<input type="checkbox"/>	CLOUGH
<input type="checkbox"/>	FALLOWS
<input type="checkbox"/>	FIRST LADY
<input type="checkbox"/>	GAMMILL
<input type="checkbox"/>	HARDEN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOYT
<input type="checkbox"/>	HUTCHESON
<input type="checkbox"/>	JAGODA
<input type="checkbox"/>	KING

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

C

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

JUN 2 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Bert Lance, Director

BL-

SUBJECT: Common Receipts Estimates

You asked that we find ways to avoid differences in receipt estimates between the Congress and the Administration. Treasury, CEA, and OMB staff have met with Congressional staff to determine what can be done. Here is what was found:

Differences

The causes of the differences in receipt estimates are illustrated by the differences between our revised estimates for 1978, as transmitted to the Congress in April, and the First Concurrent Resolution adopted by the Congress.

1978 Receipts -- Difference Between Administration Estimates
and the First Concurrent Resolution
(in billions of dollars)

April estimate.....	404.7
Differences:	
• Tax bill.....	-4.0
Other policy differences.....	+2
Different economic assumptions.....	-2.7
Other estimating differences.....	.9
Accounting difference (earned income credit).....	-1.0
Conference report on First Resolution.....	396.3

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Possibility of avoiding differences

1. Economic assumptions

- Congressional representatives state categorically that the Congress must have freedom to differ from Administration views on the economy.
- Of course, the Administration cannot promise to agree with the views of the Budget Committees on the economy.
- But staffs can get together to accommodate views whenever possible and will plan to do so.

2. Technical reestimates

- Staffs agree that, in principle, technical and estimating differences can be avoided, although in practice it may be difficult to achieve, in part because of item 4 below.

3. Legislative proposals

- Differences must continue for differences in legislative proposals, such as those that occurred during the deliberations over the recent tax bill.

4. Timing

- Since the Congress and the Administration are required by law to make estimates on different dates, changed circumstances will affect the estimates as new data become available.

Conclusion

For both short-term and longer-term receipts estimates, most technical differences can be eliminated. More consultation will minimize policy differences and differences due to economic assumptions but they will remain. In any case, such differences should be clearly identified.

cc: Secretary Blumenthal
Chairman Schultze